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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
I. ISSUE ON REVIEW. 
In its responsive brief on review, the State contends that the Appellant, Junior Larry 
Hillbroom ("Hillbroom"), failed to set forth a question presented for review in his Brief in 
Support of Petition for Review. Respondent's brief, p.2. Hillbroom's brief was not intended to 
address the merits of the case but rather to address whether this Court should accept review 
pursuant to criteria set forth in I.A.R. 11 S(b ). Hillbroom set forth a concise statement of the 
issue on review in his opening brief, which he incorporates herein by reference: 
Is a no contact order invalid under I.C. § 18-920 where it fails 
to contain a date certain for expiration? 
Br. of Appellant, p.5. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
Hillbroom agrees with and adopts the standard of review set forth by the State in its 
Respondent's Brief on Review. Respondent's Br., pp. 3-4. 
III. ARGUMENT. 
A. An order issued pursuant to I.C. § 18-920 that fails to comply with I.C.R. 
46.2 is not a no contact order; it's a plain vanilla court order. 
The State argues that a no contact order that fails to comply with the mandatory 
provisions of I.C.R. 46.2, nonetheless, remains valid under I.C. § 18-920. The State is wrong. 
The statute and criminal rule must be read together and both must be satisfied in order to obtain a 
conviction. Contrary to the State's contention, Criminal Rule 46.2 is not inconsistent with the 
substantive provisions of the statute because I.C.R. 46.2 merely distinguishes a no contact order 
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punishable under LC. § 18-920 from a plain vanilla court order, punishable under the contempt 
statutes. Therefore, the substantive law and the procedural rule are consistent and not in conflict. 
See State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 974, 188 P.3d 912, 916 (2008) ("When a statute and rule 
can be reasonably interpreted so that there is no conflict between them, they should be so 
interpreted rather than interpreted in a way that results in a conflict.") (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). 
This Court has been granted authority to make procedural rules that effectuate the 
substantive laws of this state. LC.§§ 1-212, 1-213; State v. Currington, 108 Idaho 539, 540-41, 
700 P.2d 942, 943-44 (1985). The "line of demarcation" between substantive law and procedural 
rules has been explained by this Court as follows: 
Substantive law prescribes norms for societal conduct and 
punishments for violations thereof. It thus creates, defines, and 
regulates primary rights. In contrast, practice and procedure pertain 
to the essentially mechanical operations of the courts by which 
substantive law, rights, and remedies are effectuated. 
Id. at 541, 700 P.2d at 944 (quoting State v. Smith, 84 Wash.2d 498, 527 P.2d 674, 676-77 
(1974)). 
In this case, LC.§ 18-920 provides the substantive law, to wit: "A no contact order may 
be imposed by the court or by Idaho criminal rule." LC. § 18-920(1 ). A violation of a no contact 
order is committed when: 
(a) A person has been charged or convicted under any offense 
defined in subsection (1) ofthis section; and 
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The criminal rule uses the words "shall" and "must" in defining a no contact order. The 
words "shall" and "must" are mandatory. Twin Falls Cnty. v. Idaho Comm'n on Redistricting, 
152 Idaho 346, 349, 271 P.3d 1202, 1205 (2012). The word "should" is not mandatory. Id 
The State and the lower courts have mistakenly treated Hillbroom's legal argument as 
promoting the addition of a "new" element to the crime of violation of a no contact order. That 
is incorrect. Hillbroom argues that implicit in the existing element, "A no contact order has been 
issued ... " (LC. § 18-920(2)(b), is that the order issued by the court be a valid one. Surely the 
legislature intended that only valid orders be subject to enforcement. However, the statute does 
not define a no contact order or distinguish the no contact order issued pursuant to LC. § 18-920 
from a general protection order, punishable under LC. § 39-6312, or from a plain vanilla court 
order, punishable under the civil and criminal contempt statues, LC. §§ 7-610, 18-1801. The 
authority to define the contents of the no contact order was left to this Court by a substantive 
provision in the statute and by the Court's independent rule making authority under LC. §§ 1-
212, 1-213. 
The State urges this Court to ignore the mandatory provisions in the criminal rule that 
effectuates I.C. § 18-920. In essence, the State reads the words "shall" and "must" as "should," 
as in, "no contact orders 'should' contain, at a minimum, the following information .... " But 
that is not what the rule says. The rule says a no contact order issued pursuant to LC. § 18-920 
"must" contain, inter alia, an expiration date certain. To follow the State's logic to its 
conclusion, a no contact order would remain valid even if the order was not "in writing," failed 
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to contain a "distance restriction," or failed to contain or misidentified the "victim's name." All 
those items are required under the criminal rule but not mentioned in the statute. The State's 
strained reading of the rule cannot be correct because its reading simply eviscerates the rule, or 
in legal parlance, renders it mere surplusage. 
In a nutshell, an order issued pursuant to LC. § 18-920 that fails to satisfy the mandatory 
requirements of I.C.R. 46.2 is NOT A "NO CONTACT ORDER." Rather, it's a plain vanilla 
court order. There's recent precedence for applying a criminal rule in this way. This Court in 
Reed v. Reed, 157 Idaho 705,339 P.3d 1109 (2014), reh'g denied (Jan. 14, 2015), considered the 
validity of judgments that failed to strictly comply with I.R.C.P. 54(a). The Court stated: "[T]he 
purported judgments issued on February 24, 2011, were not judgments, because they did not 
comply with the rule." Id. at_, 339 P.3rd at 1126. Similarly, the order issued to Hillbroom is 
not a no contact order because it does not comply with the rule. 
B. An offender who violates an invalid no contact order remains subject to a 
judgment of contempt. 
The State argues that a strict application of the I.C.R. 46.2 would permit an offender, who 
knows the order to be invalid, to contact the victim "without fear of criminal prosecution or other 
consequence." That is not Hillbroom's legal position. Hillbroom argues there is recourse under 
the contempt statute for violating a court's order. 
The State relies on In re Contempt of Reeves, 112 Idaho 574, 733 P.2d 795 (Ct. App. 
1987) for the proposition that an order that fails to comply with I.R.C. 46.2 remains punishable 
under LC. § 18-920 so long as it is not "transparently invalid." Such reliance is misplaced. 
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Reeves is a case of contempt arising out of a divorce action where the la\\iyer, Reeves, 
advised his client to ignore an ex parte protective order on grounds that the order failed to 
comply with the applicable civil rule, I.R.C.P. 65(b). Id at 576, 733 P.2d at 797. I.R.C.P. 65 is 
the civil rule generally applicable to all injunctions and restraining orders. The Reeves court 
concluded that the ex parte protective order, while non-compliant with I.R.C.P. 65(b) was 
possibly valid because "I.R.C.P. 65(g) stands on its O\\ill, and the rule contains no suggestion that 
it is limited by the protections of Rule 65(b)." Id. at 581, 733 P.2d at 802. But, because the 
Reeves court was uncertain as to which rule applied, it adopted a new rule, to wit: "While the 
validity of the order is a close issue, we believe the order was not so lacking in merit as to be 
"transparently invalid." Id; accord Bayes v. State, 117 Idaho 96, 100, 785 P.2d 660, 664 (Ct. 
App. 1989). 
This Court has not adopted the "transparently invalid" standard. Indeed, it has not been 
heard from since 1989. This Court may find, consistent with its holding in Reed v. Reed, that a 
valid temporary restraining order must strictly comply with the mandatory requirements of 
I.R.C.P. 65(b). But, perhaps there is a better analysis that should have been applied in Reeves to 
uphold the judgment of contempt: the legislature set forth the substantive law regarding the 
power of the trial court to compel obedience to its orders and that power may not be abridged by 
court rule. Idaho Code § 1-1603 provides that "Every court has the power ... To compel 
obedience to its judgments, orders and process, and to the orders of a judge out of court in an 
action or proceeding pending therein." LC. § 1-1603( 4) ( emphasis added). Thus, this Court is 
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without authority to promulgate rules that diminish the statutory enforcement authority granted 
to "every" court through the contempt statutes. See State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862, 864, 828 P.2d 
891, 893 (1992) (statutory provision on time to appeal a death sentence conviction held 
substantive and precluded discretion granted in criminal rule); see also Two Jinn, Inc. v. Dist. 
Court of the Fourth Judicial Dist., 150 Idaho 647, 655, 249 P.3d 840, 848 (2011) (court lacked 
authority to promulgate certain sections of the Bail Bond Guidelines because "they purport to 
make the bail agent personally liable on the surety bond bail bond.") 
The State's reliance on Reeves is misplaced because criminal prosecution under LC. § 18-
920 is different than enforcement through a contempt action. If the ex parte restraining order 
enforced in Reeves is held invalid, the court is then left without any enforcement authority under 
its general power to compel obedience to its lawful orders. See In re Weick, 142 Idaho 275, 279, 
127 P.3d 178, 182 (2005) ("Courts have the contempt power in order to preserve their 
effectiveness and sustain their inherent and statutory power."). That is not the case with an 
invalid no contact order. An order found invalid pursuant to LC. § 18-920 and LC.R. 46.2, 
remains punishable under the general contempt power of the issuing court so long as the 
violation is found to be "willful." Id at 279, 127 P.3d at 182 ("This Court has long recognized 
implicitly that one's violation of a court order must be willful to justify an order of contempt."). 
LC.§ 18-105; State v. Rice, 145 Idaho 554,556, 181 P.3d 480,482 (2008). 
Why, one might ask, should an order held invalid as a no contact order remain punishable 
under the contempt statutes? The reason and the distinction is in the mens rea element. Idaho 
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Code § 18-920 allows a special form of protective order, prosecuted as a separate crime, by a 
separate court, and most significantly, having no intent element. It is a strict liability offense. 
Consequently, this Court very carefully set forth the mandatory criteria for a valid no contact 
order in I.C.R. 46.2. It has repeatedly admonished the trial courts about complying with the rule. 
See, e.g., State v. Castro, 145 Idaho 173, 176, 177 P.3d 387,390 (2008) ("[W]e expect judges to 
provide a termination date, regardless of whether the motion to modify or terminate the no 
contact order is granted"). 
Thus, because LC. § 18-920 is a strict liability offense, always punished as a 
misdemeanor or felony, the State and the magistrate should be held to the same strict standards 
of compliance as is the defendant. Indeed, one might turn the State's argument back on itself: 
failure to strictly enforce I.C.R. 46.2 allows the State and the courts to violate the rule with 
impunity, which up to now they have done! 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should remand Hillbroom's case back to the 
magistrate for dismissal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this of March, 2015. 
BERG & McLA!]GHtfN, CHTD 
,,,////// /' 
.,//• ,/ 
/By: _,-1...., ..... /"'--"'-----------
.t/ T~y McLaughlin for William Berg 
/Attorney for Junior Larry Hillbroom 
I 
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